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FEB 9 1990  
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.  
CLERK

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No.

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IN THE  
SUPREME COURT  
OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1989

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PATRICK T. REID,  
*Petitioner*

-VS-

WHITE MOTOR CORPORATION and JOHN T. GRIGSBY, JR.,  
Disposition Assets Trustee of White Motor Corporation,  
*Respondents.*

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APPENDIX

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
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*Order of the United States Court of Appeals*

**No. 87-4066**

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT**

PATRICK T. REID,  
*Plaintiff-Appellant,*

v.

WHITE MOTOR CORPORATION, ET AL.,  
*Defendants-Appellees*

ORDER

BEFORE: KRUPANSKY and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges;  
and JOINER\*, Senior U.S. District Judge

The Court having received a petition for rehearing en banc, and the petition having been circulated not only to the original panel members but also to all other active judges of this Court, and no judge of this Court having requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc, the petition for rehearing has been referred to the original hearing panel.

The panel has further reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT  
(s) Leonard Green, *Clerk*

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\* Hon. Charles W. Joiner sitting by designation from the Eastern District of Michigan



*Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals*

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT**

**No. 87-4066**

PATRICK T. REID,  
*Plaintiff-Appellant,*

v.

WHITE MOTOR CORPORATION; JOHN  
T. GRIGSBY, JR., Disposition Assets  
Trustee for White Motor Corporation,  
*Defendants-Appellees.*

**JUDGMENT**

**BEFORE: KRUPANSKY and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges;  
and JOINER, Senior U.S. District Judge.**

ON APPEAL from the United States District Court for the  
Northern District of Ohio.

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record from the  
said district court and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here or-  
dered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said  
district court in this case be and the same is hereby affirmed as  
modified.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants-Appellees  
recover from Plaintiff-Appellant the costs on appeal, as itemized

*Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals*

below, and that execution therefor issue out of said district court,  
if necessary.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT  
(s) Leonard Green, *Clerk*

Issued as Mandate: November 22, 1989

COSTS: None

Filing fee .....\$

Printing.....\$

Total .....\$

A True Copy.

Attest:

(s) Gary McCarthy  
*Deputy Clerk*

*Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals*

**RECOMMENDED FOR FULL TEXT PUBLICATION**  
*See Sixth Circuit Rule 24*

**No. 87-4066**

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT**

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PATRICK T. REID,  
*Plaintiff-Appellant,*

v.

WHITE MOTOR CORPORATION; JOHN  
T. GRIGSBY, JR., Disposition Assets  
Trustee for White Motor Corporation,  
*Defendants-Appellees.*

ON APPEAL from the  
United States District  
Court for the Northern  
District of Ohio.

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Decided and Filed September 28, 1989

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BEFORE: KRUPANSKY and WELLFORD, Circuit  
Judges, and JOINER, Senior District Judge\*

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion of the  
court in which JOINER, Senior District Judge, joined.  
WELLFORD, Circuit Judge, (p. 22) delivered a separate opinion  
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant, Patrick T.  
Reid (Reid), has appealed from the district court's grant of  
summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, John Grigsby,

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\* Hon. Charles W. Joiner, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern  
District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

*Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals*

Jr., Trustee for White Motor Corporation (Trustee).<sup>1</sup> Reid initiated this action by filing a class proof of claim on behalf of former employees of White Motor Corporation (WMC) in bankruptcy proceedings which had been commenced by WMC. The record disclosed the following facts.

On August 16, 1971, WMC sold its Diamond Reo Truck Division to Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc. (Diamond Reo). All employees of WMC's Diamond Reo Truck Division were retained by Diamond Reo following the sale. Subsequently, on February 21, 1977, Reid, a Michigan attorney, filed an action on behalf of his client, Jerry A. Burch (Burch), seeking class certification in the Michigan Circuit Court for the County of Ingham against WMC on behalf of former WMC salaried employees in which Burch and the putative class members sought severance pay arising out of WMC's sale of Diamond Reo Truck Division to Diamond Reo. *Burch v. White Motor Corp.*, Case No. 77-19932 CK (Mich. Circuit Ct., Ingham County 1977). On August 5, 1977, the Michigan circuit court certified the case as a class action (hereinafter referred to as the *Burch* class).

On September 4, 1980, WMC filed a voluntary petition for reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio. As a result of the bankruptcy proceedings, the automatic stay provisions of Bankruptcy Code Section 362 enjoined all pending legal actions against WMC including the *Burch* lawsuit which was eventually dismissed by the Michigan circuit court on July 12, 1983 for failure to prosecute.

On September 3, 1981, Reid, as the purported agent of the *Burch* class, filed a general unsecured proof of claim (claim no.

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<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to the modified plan of reorganization confirmed by the bankruptcy court on November 18, 1983, the Trustee, John T. Grigsby, Jr., was appointed the successor in interest to White Motor Corp. for the purpose of objecting to claims filed in the bankruptcy proceedings.

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188) in WMC's bankruptcy proceeding asserting entitlement to severance pay in the amount of \$1,743,233, which was subsequently amended to \$3,097,791. Apart from his unilateral assertion of fiduciary status, Reid provided no confirmation of his agency or authority to act on behalf of the members of the *Burch* class in the WMC bankruptcy proceeding. Appended as "Attachment A" but not incorporated by reference into the proof of claim filed by Reid was a list of unidentified names, juxtaposed by dollar amounts. The named individuals were not identified as former employees of the Diamond Reo Truck Division of WMC or as members of the *Burch* class. Additionally, Reid failed to petition the bankruptcy court, pursuant to bankruptcy rule 9014, to invoke bankruptcy rule 7023, which mandated the procedure to be implemented in processing class proofs of claim in all bankruptcy proceedings. Individual proofs of claim were never filed by the individuals named in Appendix A of Reid's filed proof of claim.

After the bar date of August 30, 1983, fixed by the bankruptcy court for filing proofs of claim, the Trustee, on September 30, 1983, filed an objection to Reid's proof of claim and thereafter, on November 6, 1984, filed a motion for summary judgment. In his motion for summary judgment, the Trustee asserted that:

1. A class proof of claim is inconsistent with the bankruptcy rule 3002 mandating the filing of individual proofs of claim;
2. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 is not automatically invoked and may be implemented only by authority of the bankruptcy court upon a petitioner's duly filed motion;
3. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 could not be applied to Reid's pending claim as a matter of law because (a) he was not a member of the class or duly authorized representative; (b) he failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of Bankruptcy Rules 9014 and 7023; and (c) the class claim

*Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals*

was not adjudged superior to the claim process provided by the Bankruptcy Rules; and

4. The absent class members were barred from filing individual claims over one year after the claims bar date had passed.

Reid opposed the motion for summary judgment and argued that because the class had already been certified in the Michigan circuit court, the Trustee was collaterally estopped from contesting the class certification in the bankruptcy court. Additionally, Reid submitted an affidavit attesting that he was the attorney appointed by the Michigan circuit court to represent the purported class of former employees of WMC's Diamond Reo Truck Division.

On June 20, 1985, the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustee. The bankruptcy court decided that (1) class proofs of claim cannot be used to circumvent the requirement of Bankruptcy Rule 3003 mandating the filing of individual proofs of claim; (2) class proofs of claim are disfavored in bankruptcy; (3) Reid did not comply nor did he attempt to comply with proper procedures to certify the class in this bankruptcy proceeding mandated by Bankruptcy Rule 9014; (4) Reid was not a creditor, and thus, could not maintain the proof of claim which he filed in his own right; (5) Reid had failed to prove that he was authorized to act on behalf of the putative class; and (6) Reid had failed to show cause why the bar deadline for filing proofs of claim should be extended to permit the filing of individual proofs of claim.

Although the bankruptcy court filed its memorandum opinion on June 20, 1985, it failed to file a separate entry of judgment as required by Bankruptcy Rule 9021, the counterpart to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. To date, no separate entry of judgment complying with Bankruptcy Rule 9021 has been filed in the bankruptcy court.

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On July 22, 1985, thirty-two days after the bankruptcy court granted summary judgment, Reid filed the following three motions: (1) a motion for reconsideration; (2) a motion, pursuant to Rule 9014, to apply Rule 7023 to the contested proceeding; and (3) a motion to consider claim no. 188, the claim Reid filed, as properly filed by individuals of the *Burch* class, and/or an amendment of the filed claim or motion to permit the filing of late individual proofs of claim. The bankruptcy court, on September 11, 1985, denied Reid's motion for reconsideration because it "merely reiterate[d] the arguments previously presented in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and fails to substantiate the relief sought." The bankruptcy court further concluded that neither the application of Bankruptcy Rule 7023, nor an amendment of the claim, would be effective because Reid's proof of claim had been disallowed. Finally, the bankruptcy court noted that Reid had presented no viable reason to extend the bar date in order to permit the members of the *Burch* class to file individual proofs of claim.

On September 20, 1985, Reid appealed the bankruptcy court's June 20, 1985 order of summary judgment and the September 11, 1985 order denying his three post-judgment motions. On June 30, 1986, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision in all respects. *In Re White Motor Company*, 65 Bankr. 383 (N.D. Ohio 1986). The district court dismissed Reid's appeal from the June 20, 1985 order granting summary judgment as untimely filed. The district court also determined that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reid's remaining post-judgment motions. However, the district court's June 30, 1986 memorandum and its separate entry of judgment were erroneously recorded by the clerk of courts on the docket of Case No. C82-3209,<sup>2</sup> another matter

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<sup>2</sup> Case No. C82-3209 was an adversary proceeding which also arose in the WMC bankruptcy. The matter was entitled *Hanse et al. v. White Farm Equipment Co. et al.*

*Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals*

involving WMC, rather than to the correct docket of Case No. C85-3318. As a result of the error, Reid never received actual notice of the filing of the district court's memorandum and separate entry of judgment.

On October 3, 1987, sixteen months after the entry of the June 30, 1986 order, Reid contacted the district court to determine the status of his appeal. It was at this time the district court discovered the clerical errors on the docket entries. As a result, on October 30, 1987, the district court entered a *nunc pro tunc* order on the docket of Case No. C85-3318 declaring June 30, 1986 as the effective date of its memorandum and separate entry of judgment. Reid thereafter filed this appeal, on November 25, 1987, within thirty days of the entry of the district court's *nunc pro tunc* October 30, 1987 order.

Initially, this court is confronted with jurisdictional challenges resulting from both the bankruptcy and district courts' judgments. First, the Trustee has charged that Reid's appeal to this court was untimely, because Reid had failed to commence his appeal from the district court's final order of June 30, 1986 within the thirty-day time frame mandated by Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1).<sup>3</sup> The Trustee urged that Reid's appeal was filed on November 25, 1987, sixteen months after the June 30, 1986 order. Consequently, the Trustee in his appellate brief and in pre-argument motions has asserted that this court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Reid's instant appeal.

An appeal must be commenced "from a district court to the court of appeals. . . within thirty days after the date of entry of the

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<sup>3</sup> Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:

(a) Appeals in Civil Cases.

(1) In a civil case in which an appeal is permitted by law as of right from a district court to a court of appeals the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. . . .



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judgment or order appealed from." Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1); see also *Peake v. First National Bank and Trust Co.*, 717 F.2d 1016, 1018 (6th Cir. 1983); *Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. K-Mart Corp.*, 694 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1982). The thirty day time period commences when the district court complies with Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 and 79(a). Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(6).<sup>4</sup> Rule 58 provides that "[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment is effective *only* when set forth and when entered as provided in Rule 79(a)." Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 (emphasis added). Rule 79(a),<sup>5</sup> in turn, mandates that all orders shall be entered by the clerk of courts on the civil docket book corresponding to the case number assigned to such lawsuit.

Addressing the standards imposed by Rules 58 and 79(a), this court's attention is directed to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in *United States v. Indrelunas*, 411 U.S. 216, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam), wherein it stated that Rules 58 and 79(a), which mandate a separate entry of judgment to be recorded in the lawsuit's corresponding civil docket, must be "mechanically" applied to avoid uncertainty as to when a judgment becomes effective for appellate review.

The reason for the "separate document" provision is clear from the notes of the advisory committee of the 1963 amendment [of Rule 58]. Prior to 1963, there was consider-

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<sup>4</sup> Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(6) provides:

(6) A judgment or order is entered within the meaning of this Rule 4(a) when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

<sup>5</sup> Fed.R.Civ.P. 79(a) provides in pertinent part:

All papers filed with the clerk, all process issued and returns made thereon, all appearances, orders, verdicts, and judgments shall be entered chronologically in the civil docket on the folio assigned to the action and shall be marked with its file number. These entries shall be brief but shall show the nature of each paper filed or writ issued and the substance of each order or judgment of the court and of the returns showing execution of process. The entry of an order or judgment shall show the date the entry is made.

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able uncertainty over what actions of the District Court would constitute an entry of judgment, and occasional grief to litigants as a result of this uncertainty. To eliminate these uncertainties, which spawned protracted litigation over a technical procedural matter, Rule 58 was amended to require that a judgment was to be effective only when set forth on a separate document.

*Id.* at 220, 93 S.Ct. at 1564 (citations omitted). The thirty day time period in which to commence an appeal does not accrue until the district court has filed an entry of judgment set forth on a separate document in the civil docket. The Court explicitly rejected the notion of "case-by-case tailoring of the 'separate document' provision." *Id.* at 221, 93 S.Ct. at 1565. *See also Cloyd v. Richardson*, 510 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 58 and 79(a) is mandatory); *In re Kilgus (Reichman v. United States Fire Insurance Co.)*, 811 F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The more mechanical the application of a jurisdictional rule, the better.").

The Trustee, however, argued that the Supreme Court's decision in *Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis*, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978) (per curiam), compels this court to conclude that Reid has waived compliance with the separate document rule. The Trustee has misinterpreted *Mallis*. In *Mallis*, the district court had, in violation of Rule 58, failed to set forth on a separate document an entry of judgment. The appellant, however, had filed an appeal from the district court's memorandum within thirty days on the assumption that there had been compliance with Rule 58 and 79(a) by the district court. The Supreme Court concluded that it and the court of appeals had jurisdiction despite the technical defect of the separate document requirement. The Supreme Court stated:

In *United States v. Indrelunas*, we recognized that the separate-document rule must be "mechanically applied" in determining whether an appeal is timely. Technical applica-

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tion of the separate-judgment requirement is necessary in that context to avoid the uncertainties that once plagued the determination of when an appeal must be brought. The need for certainty as to the timeliness of an appeal, however, should not prevent the parties from waiving the separate-judgment requirement where one has accidentally not been entered. As Professor Moore notes, if the only obstacle to appellate review is the failure of the District Court to set forth its judgment on a separate document, "there would appear to be no point in obliging the appellant to undergo the formality of obtaining a formal judgment. [I]t must be remembered that the rule is designed to simplify and make certain the matter of appealability. It is not designed as a trap for the inexperienced. . . . The rule should be interpreted to prevent loss of the right to appeal, not to facilitate loss."

*Mallis*, 435 U.S. at 386, 98 S. Ct. at 1120-1121 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court anchored its decision on three factors. First, the "District Court clearly evidenced its intent that the opinion . . . represent[ed] the final decision in the case." *Id.* at 387, 98 S.Ct. at 1121. Second, the judgment of dismissal was properly recorded on the clerk's docket. And, finally, the appellee from the district court had not objected to perfecting the appeal from that order. *Id.* at 387, 98 S.Ct. at 1121. Accordingly, the Supreme Court fashioned a narrow modification of the *Indrelunas* doctrine. Where the failure of the district court to comply with the separate document principle of Rules 58 and 79(a) did not jeopardize the appellant's appeal, the Court concluded that the error could be considered waived. However, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine that under the circumstances where the failure to comply with the separate document rule has created confusion which sabotages appellate jurisdiction, the separate document requirement should continue to be mechanically applied. *Id.* at 387, 98 S.Ct. at 1121. See also *Parisie v. Greer*, 705 F.2d 882, 891

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(7th Cir.) (en banc) (Eschbach, J.) (“*Mallis* reaffirmed the holding in *Indrelunas* that ‘the separate document rule must be “mechanically applied” in determining whether an appeal is timely.’”) (quoting *Mallis*, 435 U.S. at 386, 98 S.Ct. at 1120) (emphasis in original), *cert. denied*, 464 U.S. 950 (1983); *In re Seiscom Delta, Inc.* (*Seiscom Delta, Inc. v. Two Westlake Park*), 857 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he Court [*in Mallis*], drew a careful distinction between (i) the court of appeals’ jurisdiction to entertain an appeal where the parties obviously waived the separate-document requirement by considering the judgment final, and (ii) cutting off a party’s right to appeal where the party has not waived the separate-document requirement.”) (emphasis in original); *In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co., Inc.*, 761 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1985) (same); *Amoco Oil Co. v. Jim Heiling Oil & Gas, Inc.*, 479 U.S. 966, 107 S.Ct. 468, 93 L.Ed.2d 413 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]he separate-document requirement must be applied mechanically in order to protect a party’s right of appeal, although parties may waive this requirement in order to maintain appellate jurisdiction.”) (emphasis in original); *accord Beukema’s Petroleum Co. v. Admiral Petroleum Co.*, 613 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1979).

Applying the Supreme Court’s mandate in *Indrelunas* and *Mallis* to the case at bar, the district court’s June 30, 1986 order could not operate as the final order from which an appeal was required to be taken. In contrast to *Mallis*, the clerk of the district court in the instant case entered the district court’s June 30, 1986 memorandum and entry of judgment on the wrong docket, recording the judgment on the civil docket of Case No. C82-3209 rather than the correct docket of Case No. C85-3318. Reid never received notice from the district court of the June 30, 1986 order. Upon the detection of the error by Reid, the district court on October 30, 1987 corrected the mistake by logging the memorandum order and separate entry of judgment in the correct docket and, accordingly, fulfilled the requirements of Rules 58 and 79(a)

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at that time. *Indrelunas* and *Mallis* dictate that Rules 58 and 79(a) should be applied to protect the right of an appeal. As unequivocally stated by the Court in *Mallis*, "[Rules 58 and 79(a)] should be interpreted to prevent loss of the right of appeal, not to facilitate loss." *Mallis*, 435 U.S. at 386, 98 S.Ct. at 1121. Consequently, Reid's thirty-day period in which to perfect an appeal to this court commenced to accrue on October 30, 1987, the date the district court finally complied with Rules 58 and 79(a).

The Trustee's argument that since the district court's October 30, 1987 order was designated as *nunc pro tunc*, the effective date for accruing the appellate period was June 30, 1986 and not October 30, 1987, is misplaced. The teachings of *Indrelunas* and *Mallis* preclude a district court from impeding an appellant's right to an appeal by resorting to *nunc pro tunc* entries. See, e.g., *In re D'Arcy*, 142 F.2d 313 (3d Cir. 1944). In *D'Arcy*, the district court, on June 18, 1943, entered a memorandum dismissing the plaintiff's action; however, the district court failed to issue a separate entry of judgment. On February 10, 1944, the district court, upon learning of its mistake, entered the missing entry of judgment on the docket. The district court attempted to date the effect of the February 10, 1944 order back to June 18, 1943, and thereby abrogate plaintiff's appeal. The court held that the district court's attempt to date its entry of judgment back to the original filing date of the memorandum was improper. *Id.* at 315. The court stated that:

since under Civil Procedure Rule 58 [the district court's order] could not be effective prior to its entry, it is clear that the attempt of the court to date the order back to the time of the filing of its opinion was wholly ineffective to deprive the appellant of its right to appeal.

*In re D'Arcy*, 142 F.2d at 315.

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In the case at bar, the district court improperly attempted to retroactively date its final judgment entry of October 30, 1987 to June 30, 1986 thereby depriving Reid of his appeal. The thirty-day period to appeal commenced to accrue on October 30, 1987, the date the district court corrected its error by properly docketing the entry of judgment. Accordingly, since Reid commenced the instant appeal on November 25, 1987, which was within the thirty-day period, his appeal to this court was timely filed.

In the event that this court should consider the instant appeal to this court as timely, the Trustee has urged, in the alternative, that the district court's decision, which dismissed Reid's appeal from the bankruptcy court as untimely, should be affirmed. The bankruptcy court on June 20, 1985 entered an opinion dismissing Reid's class proof of claim; however, the bankruptcy court failed to file a separate entry of judgment pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9021.<sup>6</sup> As a result of the bankruptcy court's oversight, Reid failed to commence an appeal to the district court within 10 days of the bankruptcy court's June 20, 1985 order as required by Bankruptcy Rule 8002. The appeal was not perfected until September 20, 1985. Reid's appeal was subsequently dismissed by the district court as untimely. Neither party was aware of the bankruptcy court's failure to journalize its June 30, 1985 order; at least the issue was not argued on the appeal from the bankruptcy court to the district court. On appeal to this court, Reid, citing *Indrelunas*, argued for the first time that the district court had erred in dismissing his appeal since his appeal time had not commenced to accrue because of the bankruptcy court's failure to file a separate entry of judgment.

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<sup>6</sup> Bankruptcy Rule 9021 provides:

Except as otherwise provided herein, Rule 58 F.R.Civ.P. applies in cases under the Code. Every judgment entered in an adversary proceeding or contested matter shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment is effective when entered as provided in Rule 5003. The reference in Rule 58 F.R.Civ.P. to Rule 79(a) F.R.Civ.P. shall be read as a reference to Rule 5003 of these Rules.



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Reid's argument is well taken. Bankruptcy Rule 9021 requires that a judgment becomes effective to activate the accrual of appeal time only when a separate entry of judgment is recorded in the docket pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 5003. A bankruptcy court is required to set forth on a separate document every judgment which is entered in an adversary proceeding or contested matter, and the court's clerk is to enter that separate document of the bankruptcy case. *In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co., Inc.*, 761 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1985); *Stepflug v. Federal Land Bank*, 790 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1986). The separate document rule of Bankruptcy Rule 9021 is identical to that of Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. *In re Seiscom Delta, Inc.* (*Seiscom Delta, Inc. v. Two Westlake Park*), 857 F.2d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1988); *In re Kilgus* (*Reichman v. United States Fire Insurance Co.*), 811 F.2d 1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1987) (Bankruptcy Rule 9021 is applied in the same manner as Rule 58). See generally 9 L. King, *Collier on Bankruptcy*, ¶9021.03-.04 at 9021-3 (15th ed. 1987). In the case at bar, since a separate document entering judgment had never been filed by the bankruptcy court even to date, it is patently clear that Rule 9021 was not initially satisfied. Consequently, the district court erred in dismissing Reid's appeal as untimely.

Although the bankruptcy court had failed to comply with Rule 9021, the oversight does not divest this court of its jurisdiction to entertain Reid's instant appeal. The pronouncements of *Mallis* recognize that prevailing circumstances in a given case could result in the waiver of the Rule 58 mandate. "If, by error, a separate judgment is not filed before a party appeals, nothing but delay would flow from requiring the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal. Upon dismissal, the district court would simply file and enter the separate judgment, from which a timely appeal would then be taken. Wheels would spin for no practical purpose." *Mallis*, 435 U.S. at 385, 98 S.Ct. at 1120 (footnote omitted); see also *Allah v. Superior Ct. of California*, 871 F.2d 887, 890 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (Court of Appeals mechanically applied Rule 58 to save appeal but waived formalistic remand

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because parties had failed to object to absence of separate judgment.); *Parisie*, 705 F.2d at 890 (Eschbach, J.) (A court confronted with a technically premature appeal because a separate entry of judgment had not been filed may consider the appeal without the necessity of a formalistic remand.); *accord Falls Stamping & Welding v. International Union, UAW*, 744 F.2d 521, 526 (6th Cir. 1984). Since Reid and the Trustee proceeded through the district court as if the separate document requirement had been satisfied by the bankruptcy court, the failure to have complied with Rule 9021 was waived thereby eliminating any need for a formalistic remand of this action to the bankruptcy court for entry of a separate document of entry of judgment. To conclude otherwise would result in an undue delay in a case which has already been in litigation for approximately nine years.<sup>7</sup>

In his September 20, 1985 appeal to the district court from the bankruptcy court's June 20, 1985 order granting summary judgment in favor of the Trustee and September 9, 1985 order denying his motion for reconsideration, Reid joined as issues in that appellate proceeding the propriety of the class proof of claim. Reid, on appellate review, has again argued that his class proof of claim had been improperly denied. Reid has urged that, although class actions are generally disfavored in bankruptcy proceedings, they are permitted by the bankruptcy code within the discretion of the bankruptcy judge. Reid's analysis is partially correct.

Although there is a conflict between the reported decisions considering the permissibility of a class proof of claim in bankruptcy proceedings, *see, e.g., In re Great Western Cities, Inc. of New Mexico*, 88 Bankr. 109, 112 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (and cases cited therein), the more equitable resolution was recently

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<sup>7</sup> Because the record in this case is complete and this court's only function is to determine and apply the correct legal standards to the propriety of Reid's filing a class proof of claim, there is no need for a remand to the district court to consider the merits of Reid's appeal. *See Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. Milliken*, 834 F.2d 583, 590 n.6 (6th Cir. 1987), *aff'd*, 109 S.Ct. 1333 (1989).



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enunciated by the Seventh Circuit in *In re American Reserve*, 840 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1988) which endorsed the filing of a class proof of claim. See also *In re The Charter Co. (Certified Class in the Charter Securities Litigation v. The Charter Co.)*, 876 F.2d 866 (11th Cir. 1989); Wolfson, *Class Actions In Bankruptcy: A Clash Of Policies Reconciled*, 5 Bankruptcy Dev. J. 391 (1988) (advocating that the various policies underlying class actions and bankruptcy proceedings sanction the filing of a class proof of claim).

In *American Reserve*, the claimants were insurance policyholders of the debtor. The claimants filed a proof of claim in the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings for themselves and all other defrauded policyholders who had purchased insurance policies from the debtor between 1977 and 1979. The court in *American Reserve* noted that Bankruptcy Rule 7023 expressly provided that "Rule 23 Fed.R.Civ.P. applies in adversary proceedings." The court further explained that Bankruptcy Rule 9014, which applies to contested matters in bankruptcy proceedings, permits the bankruptcy court "at any stage in a particular matter [to apply] one or more of the other rules of Part VII," which would include Rule 7023, as it relates to class actions.<sup>8</sup> *American Reserve*, 840 F.2d at 488; see also Bankruptcy Rule 9014.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, Rule

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<sup>8</sup> The instant class proof of claim is a "contested matter," rather than an "adversary proceeding." "[T]he filing of an objection to a proof of claim... creates a dispute which is a contested matter." Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9014. After a class proof of claim is filed, 11 U.S.C. 502(a) deems the claim allowed unless objected to by a party in interest. That objection creates a contested matter for which the bankruptcy court is permitted, but not obligated, to direct that Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7023 apply. An adversary proceeding may only be initiated by complaint pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7003. Such proceedings are formal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in their entirety, including the class action rules, apply to such proceedings. See also Bankruptcy Rule 7001.

<sup>9</sup> Bankruptcy Rule 9014 provides:

In a contested matter in a case under the Code not otherwise governed by these rules, relief shall be requested by motion, and reasonable notice and

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9014 authorizes bankruptcy judges, within their discretion, to invoke Rule 7023, and thereby Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, the class action rule, to "any stage" in contested matters, including, class proofs of claim.

Nor does the bankruptcy code preclude the application of the class action rules in a contested matter during a bankruptcy proceeding. Contrary to the Trustee's assertion and the bankruptcy court's conclusion, section 501 is not an exclusive list of situations where a person can file a proof of claim on behalf of a creditor. Section 501 authorizes the filing of a proof of claim by an agent in three situations: (1) by an indenture trustee on behalf of a bondholder; (2) a bankrupt's co-debtor or guarantor on behalf of a creditor; and (3) the debtor on behalf of a creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 501.<sup>10</sup> However, neither the 1978 Bankruptcy Code nor its legislative history suggests that the criteria of section 501 is exclusive. *American Reserve*, 840 F.2d at 492-493; *In re Retire-*

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opportunity for hearing shall be afforded the party against whom relief is sought. No response is required under this rule unless the court orders an answer to a motion. The motion shall be served in the manner provided for service of a summons and complaint by Rule 7004, and, unless the court otherwise directs, the following rules shall apply: 7021, 7025, 7026, 7028-7037, 7041, 7042, 7052, 7054-7056, 7062, 7064, 7069, and 7071. The court may at any stage in a particular matter direct that one or more of the other rules in Part VII shall apply. Any entity that desires to perpetuate testimony may proceed in the same manner as provided in Rule 7027 for the taking of a deposition before an adversary proceeding. The clerk shall give notice to the parties of the entry of any order directing that additional rules of Part VII are applicable or that certain of the rule of Part VII are not applicable. The notice shall be given within such time as is necessary to afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to comply with the procedures made applicable by the order.

<sup>10</sup> 11 U.S.C. 501 provides in pertinent part:

(a) A creditor or an indenture trustee may file a proof of claim. An equity security holder may file a proof of interest.

(b) If a creditor does not timely file a proof of such creditor's claim, an entity that is liable to such creditor with the debtor, or that has secured such creditor, may file a proof of such claim.

(c) If a creditor does not timely file a proof of such creditor's claim, the debtor or the trustee may file a proof of such claim.

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*ment Builders, Inc.*, 96 Bankr. 390, 392 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (“Section 501 is not meant to be an exclusive list and . . . class action filings can be considered.”). “Only a ‘clear expression of congressional intent’ terminates the ability to file representative actions under rule 23.” *American Reserve*, 840 F.2d at 490 (quoting *Califano v. Yamasaki*, 442 U.S. 682, 700, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2557, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979)).

Moreover, an interpretation that section 501 is an exclusive list of persons who are capable of filing a proof of claim on behalf of a creditor would eviscerate the meaning of two bankruptcy rules. First, Bankruptcy Rule 7023 which explicitly permits the utilization of a class action in an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court would be superfluous. See *American Reserve*, 840 F.2d at 493.

If § 501 prevents the class representative from prosecuting the claim on behalf of anyone who failed to file a proof-of-claim form. . . , then there will never be a Rule 23 class action; there will only be a “spurious class action”; [sic] yet Bankruptcy Rule 7023 says that there are to be Rule 23 class actions in bankruptcy.

*Id.*, at 493. In addition, bankruptcy rule 3001(b)<sup>11</sup> which permits the filing of a proof of claim by an “authorized” agent, would also be meaningless if section 501 was strictly construed. *Id.*, at 493. Accordingly, considering the bankruptcy code and rules *in pari materia* clearly evinces the permissibility for filing a class proof of claim. Rule 9014 delegates wide discretion to the bankruptcy judge in considering certification of class proofs of claim pursuant to Rule 7023 in a contested matter.

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<sup>11</sup> Bankruptcy Rule 3001(b) provides, in pertinent part:

A proof of claim shall be executed by the creditor of the creditor's authorized agent. . .

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In the case at bar, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reid's proof of claim on behalf of the former employees of WMC. Reid totally disregarded compliance with the bankruptcy procedures regulating the filing of class proofs of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding.

Reid failed to confirm his representative capacity to represent a class; he failed to identify the class he purportedly represented; and he failed to timely petition the bankruptcy court to apply the provisions of Rules 9014 and 7023. *In re GAC Corp. (Novack v. Callahan)*, 681 F.2d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[Claimant] never filed a Rule 914 motion requesting that Rule 723 apply, and the bankruptcy court in its direction chose not to so direct. Thus, Rule 723 . . . was never made applicable to the proceedings involved here, and in the absence of such application a class proof of claim could not properly be permitted.").<sup>12</sup> In sum, Reid ignored every mandatory requirement essential to filing a class proof of claim with the bankruptcy court.<sup>13</sup>

Moreover, Reid had no authorization designating him as a representative of the putative class. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, the class representative must be a member of the class he claims to represent. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23; *General Telephone Co. v. Falcon*, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 2370, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). "A class representative must be part of the class and 'possess the same interest and suffer the same injury' as the class members." *Davis v. Ball Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, Inc.*, 753 F.2d 1410, 1420

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<sup>12</sup> Bankruptcy Rules 914 and 723 are equivalent to the current Bankruptcy Rules 9014 and 7023, respectively.

<sup>13</sup> Reid's reliance on the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision of *In re The Charter Co.*, 876 F.2d at 873-76 for the proposition that he had timely filed a motion pursuant to Rule 9014 is misplaced. In *In re The Charter Co.*, the appellants had filed a motion pursuant to Rule 9014 to invoke Rule 7023 immediately after the trustee objected to their class proof of claim. In contrast, Reid filed a motion pursuant to Rule 9014, on July 22, 1985, after the bankruptcy court had granted the Trustee's motion for summary judgment dismissing Reid's purported class proof of claim.

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(7th Cir. 1985) (quoting *East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez*, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 1896, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977)). "Stated another way, the plaintiff must have standing to represent the class." *In re W.T. Grant Co.*, 24 Bankr. 421, 425 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). The individuals seeking class certification have the burden of proving that they are entitled to class certification. *Senter v. General Motors Corp.*, 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 429 U.S. 870 (1976). In the case at bar, Reid was not a member of the class of former employees of WMC's Diamond Reo Truck Division. Reid was merely an attorney who had offered his services to the putative class in order to prosecute their entitlement to severance pay against WMC. As such, Reid lacked standing to initiate this class action.

Reid, however, has argued that he was the authorized agent of the putative class and had filed the class proof of claim in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 3001(b). Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019, a purported agent must file a verified statement with the clerk of the bankruptcy court. The statement must include a copy of the instrument, if any, whereby the agent is empowered to act on behalf of the creditors he is representing. *In re Electronics Theatre Restaurants Corp.*, 57 Bankr. 147 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (Rule 2019 requires that every person purporting to represent more than one creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding file a verified statement setting forth the names and addresses of the creditors, the nature and amount of the claims and the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the employment of the agent.). Failure to comply with Rule 2019 is cause for denial of the proof of claim. *In re Baldwin United Corp.*, 52 Bankr. 146, 148 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985). Reid, who was an attorney representing the class and not a member of the class, has never filed a verified statement, pursuant to Rule 2019, with the clerk of the bankruptcy court delineating his authority to act as an agent for any purported class. His unilateral assertion of fiduciary status in his proof of claim was insufficient to satisfy the formal requirements of Rule 2019.

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Moreover, Reid's argument that since he was authorized to represent the *Burch* class in the Michigan circuit court, he was subsequently authorized as an agent for the purported class in the instant action is less than persuasive. It is well-settled that consent to being a member or the representative of a class "in one piece of litigation is not tantamount to a blanket consent to any litigation the class counsel may wish to pursue." *In re Standard Metals Corp.*, 817 F.2d 625, 631 (10th Cir. 1987), *modified on other grounds*, 839 F.2d 1383 (1988); *In re Manville Forest Products Corp.*, 89 Bankr. 358, 376-77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); *In re Baldwin United Corp.*, 52 Bankr. 146, 149 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); *cf. In re Ross*, 37 Bankr. 656, 658 (Bankr. 9th Cir. BAP 1984). Accordingly, the bankruptcy court was well within its discretion to dismiss Reid's class proof of claim since he has failed to elucidate his authority as agent for the WMC former employees.<sup>14</sup>

In conclusion, although the bankruptcy rules permit the filing of a class proof of claim, Reid blatantly failed to comply with the bankruptcy procedure to commence a class action. As a result, the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reid's class proof of claim. This court has considered Reid's remaining assignments of error and considers them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby **AFFIRMED** as **MODIFIED**.

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<sup>14</sup> Nor did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by not extending the bar date to allow the supposed class members to file individual proofs of claim. "The decision not to extend the bar date deadline is within the sound discretion of the [bankruptcy] judge." *Vancouver Women's Health Soc. v. A.H. Robins Co.*, 820 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1987). *See also In the Matter of GAC Corp.*, 681 F.2d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 1982) (Bankruptcy judge did not abuse discretion in not extending bar date when the purported class members had relied on their class proof of claim instead of filing individual proof of claims.). Accordingly, the bankruptcy court acted within in its sound discretion by precluding the extension of the bar date.



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WELLFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

This is a difficult case procedurally, and the result reached works a hardship on the class represented by Mr. Reid. I am in complete agreement with the analysis reached that would preclude the district court from impeding a right to appeal through means of *nunc pro tunc* orders. (I am also in agreement that Reid's appeal was, under the circumstances, timely and that we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.)

I concur in the conclusion also that bankruptcy rules permit the filing of a proof of claim by an "authorized agent." I dissent concerning the exercise of discretion by the bankruptcy court in denying Reid's proof of claim on behalf of others who were former employees of White Motor Corporation. He should, in my view, have granted Reid the right to file, or to amend, the proof of claim in order to permit these employees to proceed as a class action. It is true that Reid himself was not a member of the class he purported to represent, but the real question is whether he properly could be considered an authorized agent. I harbor the conviction that the bankruptcy court (and the district court) were guilty of a clear error in judgment in reaching the conclusion to deny the claim (or claims) based on Reid's agency status and in refusing to permit an amendment.

In that important respect, then, I depart from the opinion of my brothers and respectfully DISSENT.

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**REFERENCE DATA**

Case Name: Reid v. White Motor Corporation

Case Number: 87-4066

Argued: February 10, 1989

Case Below: Northern Ohio D.C. No. C85-3318 (Batchelder, D.J.)

Counsel for plaintiff-appellant: Patrick R. Hogan, Lansing, MI.

Counsel for defendants-appellees: David C. Weiner, Hahn, Loeser & Parks, Cleveland, OH.



*Opinion of the District Court*

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
EASTERN DIVISION**

IN RE:  
WHITE MOTOR CORPORATION  
*Debtor*

Civil Action No. C82-3209  
C 85-3318

**MEMORANDUM AND  
ORDER**

ALDRICH, J.

Patrick T. Reid appeals from an order entered by the bankruptcy court on June 20, 1985 granting summary judgment in favor of the Disposition Assets Trustee ("the DAT") for White Motor Corporation ("WMC") on a claim filed by Reid on behalf of a class of former WMC employees. Reid also appeals from an order entered by the bankruptcy court on September 11, 1985, denying three post-judgment motions. Pending before the Court is the DAT's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and motion to dismiss for failure to demonstrate abuse of discretion. For the reasons set forth below, the DAT's motions are granted and the appeals are dismissed.

The District Court's appellate jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. §158,<sup>1</sup> as enacted by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.

<sup>1</sup> Title 28 U.S.C. §158 provides in pertinent part:

(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments, orders, and decrees, and, with leave of the court, from interlocutory orders and decrees, of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title. An appeal under this subsection shall be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving.

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(c) An appeal under subsection[ ] (a) . . . of this section shall be taken in the same manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts of appeals from the district courts and in the time provided by Rule 8002 of the Bankruptcy Rules.

*Opinion of the District Court*

## I.

The facts which are pertinent to ruling on the DAT's motion are succinctly and adequately set forth in the bankruptcy court's June 20, 1985 order. *In re White Motor Corp.*, No. B80-3361 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 20, 1985) ("June 20 order"). The parties have not objected to the bankruptcy court's findings of fact, which in their entirety state:

1. On September 4, 1980, WMC filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. (11 U.S.C. §1101 et. seq.) On November 18, 1983, a modified plan of reorganization was confirmed. Under the plan the DAT, John T. Grigsby, Jr., is successor in interest to WMC for the purpose of objecting to claims.

2. On September 3, 1981 claim No. 188 was filed for \$1,743,233.05 and subsequently amended to \$3,097,791.99.

3. Patrick T. Reid, an attorney, filed claim No. 188 as agent for a class of former WMC employees. The claim which asserts rights to severance pay arises from a class action filed against WMC on February 21, 1977 in Michigan State Court. In the case of *Burch v. WMC*, Case No. 77-19932-CK, Reid filed a class action alleging the same liability as asserted herein. That action certified by the State Court was eventually dismissed.

4. Reid is not a member of the class for which he filed the claim.

5. Appended to claim No. 188 is a list of names and amounts, the significance of which is unexplained. Presumably the list consists of members of the class on whose behalf the claim was filed. It is unclear, however, whether those

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listed are actual or potential members of the State Court class action.

6. August 30, 1983 was the bar date for filing claims in the WMC case.

7. On September 20, 1983, the DAT filed objection to claim No. 188 asserting it was the subject of a contested lawsuit and should be expunged. On November 6, 1984, the DAT filed the motion for summary judgment [on his objection to claim No. 188].

In support of his motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7056<sup>2</sup>, the DAT argued that (1) Reid's class claim could not be used to circumvent the requirement of Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(2)<sup>3</sup> that individual proofs of claim be filed; (2) Reid had not moved, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule

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<sup>2</sup> Bankruptcy Rule 7056 provides that "Rule 56 F. R. Civ. P. applies in adversary proceedings."

<sup>3</sup> Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(2) provides:

Any creditor or equity security holder whose claim or interest is not scheduled or scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated shall file a proof of claim or interest within the time prescribed by subdivision (c)(3) of this rule; any creditor who fails to do so shall not be treated as a creditor with respect to such claim for the purposes of voting and distribution.

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9014,<sup>4</sup> for application of Bankruptcy Rule 7023,<sup>5</sup> which governs the procedure for filing a class proof of claim; (3) even if Bankruptcy Rule 7023 was applicable, Reid had not satisfied that rule's procedural requirements since he was not a member of the class, he had not sought certification as soon as practicable after filing the claim, a class action would not better protect individual interests, and because a class action was not necessary to accommodate the claims of individual class members; and (4) the claims bar date prevented class members from filing late individual claims, even though the class action was timely filed.

Reid argued in opposition that the class had already been certified in the Michigan state court action and that the DAT was therefore estopped from contesting the class certification in bankruptcy court. Reid also contended that the DAT had not been prejudiced by the delay in seeking class certification and that recertification was unnecessary, inappropriate and inefficient. In an apparent effort to create a genuine issue of material fact, Reid

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<sup>4</sup> Bankruptcy Rule 9014 provides:

In a contested matter in a case under the Code not otherwise governed by these rules, relief shall be requested by motion, and reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing shall be afforded the party against whom relief is sought. No response is required under this rule unless the court orders an answer to a motion. The motion shall be served in the manner provided for service of a summons and complaint by Rule 7004, and, unless the court otherwise directs, the following rules shall apply: 7021, 7025, 7026, 7028-7037, 7041, 7042, 7052, 7054-7056, 7062, 7064, 7069, and 7071. The court may at any stage in a particular matter direct that one or more of the other rules in Part VII shall apply. A person who desires to perpetuate testimony may proceed in the same manner as provided in Rule 7027 for the taking of a deposition before an adversary proceeding. The clerk shall give notice to the parties of the entry of any order directing that additional rules of Part VII are applicable or that certain of the rules of Part VII are not applicable. The notice shall be given within such time as is necessary to afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to comply with the procedures made applicable by the order.

<sup>5</sup> Bankruptcy Rule 7023 provides that "Rule 23 F. R. Civ. P. applies in adversary proceedings." Rule 23, of course, states the procedural requirements for bringing a class action.

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submitted an affidavit stating that he was the attorney appointed by the Michigan state court to represent former employees of WMC in a certified class action.

On June 20, 1985, the bankruptcy court entered its order granting the DAT's motion for summary judgment. In a concise opinion, the court held that:

No section of the Code authorizes filing a class claim. A proof of claim must be "executed by the creditor or the creditor's authorized agent. . . ." Bankruptcy Rule 3001(b). Bankruptcy Rule 7023 which governs class actions is applicable to contested claims only on court order under Bankruptcy Rule 9014. Class actions, therefore, are not directly available as a procedural mechanism for filing claims. While Rule 9014 authorizes the court to apply Rule 7023, as a general rule courts deem class actions inappropriate to claim proceedings.

Because the courts generally disfavor these actions and Reid failed to timely request authorization prior to filing the class claim, this Court declines to order Bankruptcy Rule 7023 applicable to the Reid claim.

The certification of the class action in the State Court is not binding on this Court and is not determinative of the propriety of a class proceeding on claims. Moreover, since Reid is not a WMC creditor and the claim cannot be maintained on behalf of the class, there exists no genuine issue of material fact regarding the impropriety of the claim. Further, Reid does not assert that he was authorized by individual creditors to file claims on their behalf. Summary judgment on the DAT's objection to claim is, therefore, appropriate.

The parties dispute whether individual class members should be permitted to file late claims for the liability asserted in the class claim. As a rule a class action cannot be

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maintained to circumvent the requirement of filing individual claims. Individual class members who failed to file claims are now barred by the Court's order of August 1, 1983. Extending the bar date for cause is within the sound discretion of the court. There is no basis, however, for extension of the bar date in this case. Adequate notice was given and Reid has failed to establish grounds for such extension. Moreover, Reid has failed to distinguish which individuals are to be included within the scope of the requested extension. Extension of the bar date is, therefore, denied. It is worthy of note that the Court cannot deal dispositively with potential motions to allow the filing of late claims.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that DAT's motion for summary judgment on the objection to claim No. 188 is granted.

June 20 order, slip op. at 2-4 (citations omitted).

**B.**

Reid did not preserve his right to appeal by filing a notice of appeal within the ten-day period allowed under Bankruptcy Rule 8002.<sup>6</sup> Instead, on July 22, 1985, thirty-two days after his claim had been disallowed, Reid filed a flurry of motions. First, in his motion for reconsideration, Reid argued that the bankruptcy court had erred in granting summary judgment. In short, Reid therein reiterated the arguments he previously made concerning the propriety of class certification. Second, Reid belatedly moved under Bankruptcy Rule 9014 to apply, *inter alia*, Bankruptcy Rule 7023. Finally, Reid filed a tripartite motion requesting that (1) putative class members be permitted to amend the proof of

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<sup>6</sup> Bankruptcy Rule 8002 provides in relevant part:

(a) The notice of appeal shall be filed with the clerk of the bankruptcy court within 10 days of the date of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from.

If a timely notice of appeal is not filed, no appeal may be taken later. Advisory Committee Note to Bankruptcy Rule 8002.

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claim; (2) the court consider his claim as the claim of each putative class member, as if filed individually; and (3) the claims bar date be extended to permit putative class members an opportunity to file tardy proofs of claim.

The bankruptcy court denied Reid's motion for reconsideration because it "merely reiterates the arguments previously presented in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and fails to substantiate the relief sought." *In re White Motor Corp.*, No. B80-3361, slip op. at 2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 1985) ("Sept. 11 order"). The court further held that neither the application of Bankruptcy Rule 7023, nor an amendment of the claim would be effective because Reid's claim had been disallowed. Finding that, "[a]s previously stated, class action claims cannot be maintained to circumvent the requirement of filing individual claims," *id.* at 2, the court denied Reid's motion to consider his claim properly filed by putative class members. Finally, since "the Court previously held that cause was not established to justify extension of the claims bar date," and Reid had "again failed to substantiate cause for extending the bar date," *id.* at 2-3, the court denied Reid's motion to extend the claims bar date to permit the filing of tardy individual claims.

On September 19, 1985, Reid filed a notice of appeal, ninety-one days after the bankruptcy court had disallowed his claim. Pending before this Court are the DAT's motion to dismiss Reid's appeal for lack of jurisdiction and his motion to dismiss for failure to demonstrate abuse of discretion.

Upon examination of the briefs and record, this Court determines that "the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Bankruptcy Rule 8012.



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## II.

## A.

The DAT contends that Reid's post-judgment motions did not toll the running of his appeal time. Reid's failure to file a timely notice of appeal in the DAT's view therefore deprives this Court of jurisdiction over Reid's appeal from the bankruptcy court's June 20 order. With respect to Reid's post-judgment motions, the DAT argues that they should all be treated as motions made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b),<sup>7</sup> since "[e]very one of the issues raised in and by these motions had been raised by the Trustee in its Motion for Summary Judgment and decided in favor of the Trustee by the Bankruptcy Court in its June 20 Order." Motion to Dismiss at 5. The DAT goes on to claim that the denial of Reid's post-judgment motions must be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. He therefore concludes that:

Since those motions were not predicated on any of the grounds set forth under Rule 60(b), the Bankruptcy Court's actions could not have been an abuse of discretion and this Court should dismiss Reid's appeal of the Order. Reid must not be permitted to circumvent the time limitations for the filing of an appeal and obtain a review of the underlying

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<sup>7</sup> Bankruptcy Rule 9024 makes Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) applicable to cases under the Bankruptcy Code. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides in relevant part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.



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June 20 judgment through an appeal of the denial of his motions for reconsideration.

In response, Reid contends first that the June 20 order was not final and therefore not appealable, citing *Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay*, 437 U.S. 461, 464 (1978), for the proposition that an order denying class certification is not final. Reid further argues that because the bankruptcy court could have vacated the June 20 order, that order could not have been final. He concludes that only when the various post-judgment motions had been denied did the time for appeal begin to run.

In the alternative, Reid argues that the June 20 order was not final because it granted only partial summary judgment. The order, he insists, did not finally determine the rights of individual claimants. Upon this rather precarious foundation he concludes that the right to appeal arose when the second order was entered, since the bankruptcy court therein finally determined the claims of individual claimants.

Noting that Bankruptcy Rule 3008 governing reconsideration of claims carries no time limit, Reid next argues that his motions for reconsideration were timely filed. Relying on his assertion that the June 20 order was not final, he then asserts that the requirements of Rule 60(b) do not apply to his post-judgment motions because Rule 60(b) applies only to final judgments and orders. Even conceding the finality of the June 20 order and thus the applicability of Rule 60(b), Reid argues that the denial of his post-judgment motions is reviewable because "relief is available under Rule [3008] after the time to appeal from a particular order of the Bankruptcy Judge has expired." Brief in Opposition at 13 (quoting *In re W.F. Hurley, Inc.*, 612 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1980)).

Reid then contends alternatively that his motions met the requirements of Rule 60(b). Reid points out that the bankruptcy court's finding that he was not authorized by individual creditors

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of WMC to file their claims constitutes a mistake of fact within the parameters of Rule 60(b)(1). Reid reaches this conclusion based on the Michigan state court's decision to certify a class of individual claimants. Reid insists that this mistake of fact represented a genuine issue of material fact which should have precluded the bankruptcy court from disposing of his claim on summary judgment. Moreover, Reid argues that the June 20 order should have been set aside under Rule 60(b)(6). He does not, however, explain why Rule 60(b)(6) applies.

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## III.

A. *The June 20 Order*

Reid's appeal teeters atop his argument that the June 20 order was not final and thus not appealable. It is well-settled that a final decision is one which terminates the litigation on the merits. *Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay*, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); *Catlin v. United States*, 324 U.S. 229 (1945). It seems rather obvious and beyond contention, therefore, that an order which grants summary judgment and thereby completely terminates a case is a final order. 9 J. Moore, *Moore's Federal Practice* ¶110.07, at 108 n.6 (relegating this observation to a footnote). *Cf. In re Smith*, 735 F.2d 459 (11th Cir. 1984) (order denying summary judgment is interlocutory for purposes of appeal); *Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.*, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942), cited in 9 J. Moore, *supra*, at n.6 (partial summary judgment).

Reid's reliance on *Coopers & Lybrand* is entirely misplaced. The present case is easily distinguishable because here the bankruptcy court ended the litigation by granting summary judgment. Furthermore, Reid's argument that the June 20 order granted only partial summary judgment because it "did not finally determine the rights of the individual claimants," Brief in Opposition at 10, is utterly devoid of merit. Put in equivalent logical terms, Reid is contending that an action by A against B is not complete until the rights of C have been adjudicated. This logic so undermines the need for finality in litigation that it must be rejected. Nonparties whose claims are time-barred should, according to Reid, be able to avoid the applicable statute of limitations or, as here, the claims bar date, by reopening a prior final judgment in which their rights were implicated. In any event, by its own terms the June 20 order obviously did not grant only partial summary judgment.

Here, the bankruptcy court entered its order granting summary judgment on June 20, 1985. The time for Reid to file a

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notice of appeal began to run on that date. *Jetero Const. Co., Inc. v. South Memphis Lumber Co.*, 531 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1976) (a decision is final for purposes of appeal and for purposes of post-judgment motions when judgment has been entered). Since Reid did not file his notice of appeal until September 19, 1985, this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the June 20 order. *In re LBL Sports Center, Inc.*, 684 F.2d 410 (6th Cir. 1982). See also Advisory Committee Note to Bankruptcy Rule 8002 cited *supra* note 6. With respect to the June 20 order, the DAT's motion to dismiss is granted.

**B. The Motion for Reconsideration**

Reid's motion for reconsideration simply renewed and reiterated the legal arguments which the bankruptcy court disposed of on summary judgment. Under Bankruptcy Rule 9024, motions for reconsideration are to be treated as Rule 60(b) motions. 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶3.03[8] (15th ed. 1979).

The fundamental basis for Reid's motion for reconsideration is legal error. As recognized by the Sixth Circuit, "a claim of legal error [is] subsumed in the category of mistake under Rule 60(b)(1). A 60(b)(1) motion based on legal error must be brought within the normal time for taking an appeal." *Pierce v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund for 1950 and 1974*, 770 F.2d 449, 451 (6th Cir. 1985). Likewise, a claim of legal error unaccompanied by extraordinary circumstances is not cognizable under Rule 60(b)(6). *Id.* For these reasons, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear Reid's appeal from the bankruptcy court's denial of his motion for reconsideration. *In re LBL Sports Center, Inc.*, 684 F.2d 410.

Reid's present appeal constitutes a not too subtle attempt to bootstrap an appeal of the underlying summary judgment decision onto the denial of his motion for reconsideration, not to mention his other post-judgment motions. As stated by the Sixth Circuit:

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It is settled that a 60(b) motion "cannot be used to avoid the consequences of a party's decision . . . to forego an appeal from an adverse ruling." This admonition applies with particular force to a motion based on legal error. The interests of finality of judgments and judicial economy outweigh the value of giving a party a second bite of the apple by allowing a 60(b) motion, after the appeal period has run, on the same legal theory that would have been asserted on appeal.

*Pierce*, 770 F.2d at 451-52 (citation omitted).

One must question why Reid moved the bankruptcy court to reconsider and reverse its June 20 order, when he now argues that that order was not final. The answer is of course that Reid knew (or should have known) that the summary judgment decision completely disposed of his claim. The only procedure by which he could obtain judicial review of the June 20 order was a motion under Bankruptcy Rule 9024. Reid's contention that the summary judgment decision was not a final order only highlights the contradiction in his argument. In the final analysis, Reid has been hoist by his own petard.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> [H]oist by his own petard means "destroyed by his own trickery or inventiveness." A *petard*, in medieval warfare, was an explosive charge which daring warriors would affix to the walls or gate of a castle under siege. This action in itself was a most hazardous one, but the greatest danger came after the *petard* was in place. The explosive was detonated by a slow match or slowly burning fuse. Occasionally, of course, the explosive went off prematurely, in which case the warrior was *hoist* (lifted or heaved) *by his own petard*. It is unlikely that this archaic phrase would have persisted in our language, even in a figurative sense, had not Shakespeare conferred immortality upon it with this line from *Hamlet*: "'Tis the sport to have the engineer hoist with his own petard." Today it is chiefly used to describe a person ruined by plans or devices with which he had plotted to ensnare others.

W. Morris & M. Morris, *Dictionary of Word and Phrase Origins* 285-86 (1977).

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*C. The Other Post-Judgment Motions*

Although the parties disputed whether individual class members should be permitted to file late claims, the bankruptcy court noted in its June 20 order that it could not "deal dispositively with potential motions to allow the filing of late claims." June 20 order at 3. The remaining post-judgment motions arguably raised new matters which were not previously before the bankruptcy court. To the extent, therefore, that Reid's companion motions to permit late filing of claims and to consider claims properly filed by individual claimants were not disposed of by the June 20 order, this Court has jurisdiction to review the September 11 order denying those motions. Similarly, Reid's motions to permit amendment of his claim and to apply various adversary rules were properly raised post-judgment and are reviewable by this Court.

Post-judgment motions made more than ten days after the entry of judgment are to be treated as Rule 60(b) motions. 12 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶307.04[4] (14th ed. 1978).<sup>9</sup> An order denying a motion under Rule 60(b) is final and appealable. 11 C. Wright & A. Miller §2871 (1973). In reviewing Rule 60(b) motions, this Court is to set aside the decision of the lower court only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. *Bank of Montreal v. Olafsson*, 648 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1981). As stated by the Sixth Circuit in *Stephens Industries, Inc. v. McClung*, No. 85-5694, slip op. at 5 (6th Cir. April 28, 1986) (quoting *In re Posner*, 700 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848 (1983)), "a reviewing court may determine that the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion only when there is a definite and firm conviction that

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<sup>9</sup> The procedure for bringing post-judgment motions is controlled by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60, made applicable to bankruptcy cases by Bankruptcy Rules 9023 and 9024. Rule 59 regulates motions for a new trial and to alter or amend judgment, and must be served within ten days of the entry of judgment. Rule 60 controls motions to reopen a case and to reconsider an order, but there is no similar time limit. Hence, post-judgment motions not falling within the parameters of Rule 59 are to be treated as Rule 60 motions. See Advisory Committee Notes to Bankruptcy Rules 9023 and 9024.

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the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of all relevant factors.' "

Upon consideration, this Court holds that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reid's motions to permit late filing of claims and to consider claims properly filed by individual claimants. At no time has Reid shown cause for extending the claims bar date, and to have considered his claim properly filed by individual claimants would have accomplished that very result. Moreover, Reid did not articulate a basis for relief under any of the provisions of Rule 60(b).<sup>10</sup>

With respect to Reid's motions to permit amendment of his claim and to apply various adversary rules, the bankruptcy court in effect held that there was nothing pending before the court either which could be amended or to which those rules could be applied. This decision was not an abuse of discretion. The bankruptcy court could not very well allow amendment of Reid's claim or application of various procedural rules when there was no

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<sup>10</sup> Reid's only argument is that the bankruptcy court's determination that he was not authorized by individual creditors to file their claims constituted a mistake of fact cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1). This argument is meritless since it fails to address the issues raised by his motions to permit late filing of claims and to consider claims properly filed by individual claimants.

In fact, the argument relates to the underlying June 20 order and to his motion for reconsideration; specifically, it relates to the propriety of class certification. Even if this Court had jurisdiction to consider it, his Rule 60(b)(1) argument would not be convincing. The fact that Reid may have been authorized to file claims for putative class members was entirely immaterial to the bankruptcy court's decision not to certify a class. The court recognized that class actions are disfavored in bankruptcy cases and, in any event, Reid was not even a member of the class which he purported to represent as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Thus, even if the bankruptcy court made the supposed mistake of fact, such fact was not material to the issue of whether or not to certify the class. Therefore, summary judgment was not inappropriate.

Since, however, Reid failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the June 20 order, this Court has held in parts III A and B of this opinion that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the June 20 order and from the denial of Reid's motion for reconsideration.



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case pending before the court. C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1484 (1972). Reid first had to succeed in vacating the June 20 decision in order to lend efficacy to these motions. Reid having failed to do so, the bankruptcy court correctly held that "[a]n order applying the adversary rules and permitting amendment of a disallowed claim would be inoperative." Sept. 11 order at 2.

## IV.

For the reasons set forth above, the DAT's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is granted with respect to Reid's appeal from the June 20 order and the denial of his post-judgment motion for reconsideration. With respect to the remainder of Reid's post-judgment motions, the DAT's motion to dismiss for failure to demonstrate abuse of discretion is granted and the bankruptcy court's order disposing of those motions is affirmed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

(s) ANN ALDRICH  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT  
JUDGE

*Opinion of the Bankruptcy Court granting  
summary judgment against the Petitioner*

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
EASTERN DIVISION**

IN RE:

WHITE MOTOR CORPORATION  
*Debtor*

} In Proceedings for a  
Reorganization Under Chapter 11  
Case No. B 80-3361

**ORDER**

Before the Court is the motion of the Disposition Assets Trustee (DAT) for summary judgment on his objection to claim No. 188 filed by Patrick T. Reid. Claimant submitted a response and brief in opposition. The Reid class claim against the estate of White Motor Corporation (WMC) is in issue.

Upon consideration the Court finds:

1. On September 4, 1980, WMC filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. (11 U.S.C. §1101 et. seq.) On November 18, 1983, a modified plan of reorganization was confirmed. Under the plan the DAT, John T. Grigsby, Jr., is successor in interest to WMC for the purpose of objecting to claims.

2. On September 3, 1981 claim No. 188 was filed for \$1,743,233.05 and subsequently amended to \$3,097,791.99.

3. Patrick T. Reid, an attorney, filed claim No. 188 as agent for a class of former WMC employees. The claim which asserts rights to severance pay arises from a class action filed against WMC on February 21, 1977 in Michigan State Court. In the case of *Burch v WMC*, Case No. 77-19932-CK, Reid filed a class action alleging the same liability as asserted herein. That action certified by the State Court was eventually dismissed.

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summary judgment against the Petitioner*

4. Reid is not a member of the class for which he filed the claim.

5. Appended to claim No. 188 is a list of names and amounts, the significance of which is unexplained. Presumably the list consists of members of the class on whose behalf the claim was filed. It is unclear, however, whether those listed are actual or potential members of the State Court class action.

6. August 30, 1983 was the bar date for filing claims in the WMC case.

7. On September 20, 1983, the DAT filed objection to claim No. 188 asserting it was the subject of a contested lawsuit and should be expunged. On November 6, 1984, the DAT filed the motion for summary judgment.

No section of the Code authorizes filing a class claim. A proof of claim must be "executed by the creditor or the creditor's authorized agent. . . ." Bankruptcy Rule 3001(b). Bankruptcy Rule 7023 which governs class actions is applicable to contested claims only on court order under Bankruptcy Rule 9014. Class actions, therefore, are not directly available as a procedural mechanism for filing claims. While Rule 9014 authorizes the court to apply Rule 7023, as a general rule courts deem class actions inappropriate to claim proceedings. *Novak v Callahan*, (In re: G.A.C. Corp.), 681 F.2d 1295, (11th Cir., 1982); *S.E.C. v Aberdeen Securities Co., Inc.*, 480 F.2d 1121, (3rd Cir., 1973); *In re: Society of the Divine Savior*, 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 294, (D.C.E.D. Wisc., 1971) and *In re: Shulman Transport Enterprises, Inc.*, 21 B.R. 548, (Bankr., S.D.N.Y., 1982), *aff'd.*, 33 B.R. 383, (D.C.S.D.N.Y., 1983), but see *In re: W. T. Grant Co.*, 24 B.R. 421, (Bankr., S.D.N.Y., 1982), and *In re: R.E.A. Express, Inc.*, 10 B.R. 812, (Bankr., S.D.N.Y., 1981).

Because the courts generally disfavor these actions and Reid failed to timely request authorization prior to filing the class

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summary judgment against the Petitioner*

claim, this Court declines to order Bankruptcy Rule 7023 applicable to the Reid claim.

The certification of the class action in the State Court is not binding on this Court and is not determinative of the propriety of a class proceeding on claims. *Moore v Ross*, (*In re: Ross*), 37 B.R. 656, (*Bankr.*, 9th Cir., 1984. Moreover, since Reid is not a WMC creditor and the claim cannot be maintained on behalf of the class, there exists no genuine issue of material fact regarding the impropriety of the claim. Further, Reid does not assert that he was authorized by individual creditors to file claims on their behalf. Summary judgment on the DAT's objection to claim is, therefore, appropriate.

The parties dispute whether individual class members should be permitted to file late claims for the liability asserted in the class claim. As a rule a class action cannot be maintained to circumvent the requirement of filing individual claims. *In re: Grocerland Cooperative, Inc.*, 32 B.R. 427, (*Bankr.*, N.D. Ill., 1983) and *In re: Woodmoor Corp.*, 4 B.R. 186, (*Bankr.*, D. Colo., 1980). Individual class members who failed to file claims are now barred by the Court's order of August 1, 1983. Extending the bar date for cause is within the sound discretion of the court. Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) and *G.A.C.*, *supra*. There is no basis, however, for extension of the bar date in this case. Adequate notice was given and Reid has failed to establish grounds for such extension. Moreover, Reid has failed to distinguish which individuals are to be included within the scope of the requested extension. Extension of the bar date is, therefore, denied. It is worthy of note that the Court cannot deal dispositively with potential motions to allow the filing of late claims.

*Opinion of the Bankruptcy Court granting  
summary judgment against the Petitioner*

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that DAT's motion for summary judgment on the objection to claim No. 188 is granted.

Dated this 20th day of June, 1985.

(s) William J. O'Neill  
*United States Bankruptcy Judge*

cc: E. Michael Stafford  
Laurence E. Oster  
David C. Weiner  
Patrick A. Heinann  
Richard Gurbst  
John C. Parks

*Opinion of the Bankruptcy Court denying  
the Petitioner's post-trial motions*

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
EASTERN DIVISION**

IN RE:

WHITE MOTOR CORPORATION  
*Debtor*

} Case No. B80-03361

**ORDER DENYING MOTIONS OF PATRICK T. REID**

This matter is before the Court on motions of Patrick T. Reid for (1) reconsideration of the order disallowing Claim No. 188; (2) for an order pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9014 to apply various adversary rules to Claim No. 188; and (3) for an order to consider claims properly filed by individual claimants, or to permit amendment or late filing of claims. The Disposition Assets Trustee (DAT) of White Motor Corporation filed responses thereto. By order of June 20, 1985, this Court previously granted the DAT's motion for summary judgment on objection to Claim No. 188.

On consideration the Court finds:

(1) Summary judgment on objection to Claim No. 188 was appropriately rendered as a matter of law for reasons stated in the June 20, 1985 order. Summary judgment was specifically applicable pursuant to B.R. 9014 which incorporates B.R. 7056. Movant's request for reconsideration merely reiterates arguments previously presented in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and fails to substantiate the relief sought.

(2) Movant requests application of Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules to this contested matter including B.R. 7023 pertaining to class actions and B.R. 7015 regarding amendment of pleadings. Movant further seeks authority to amend Claim No. 188. As a result of this Court's order of summary judgment and

*Opinion of the Bankruptcy Court denying  
the Petitioner's post-trial motions*

disposition of movant's request for reconsideration, Claim No. 188 has been disallowed. Moreover, the June 20, 1985 order specifically denied application of B.R. 7023. An order applying the adversary rules and permitting amendment of a disallowed claim would be inoperative and is, therefore, denied.

(3) Movant requests that Claim No. 188 be considered properly filed by individual claimants or that such claimants be permitted to file tardy claims. As previously stated, class action claims cannot be maintained to circumvent the requirement of filing individual claims. *In re Grocerland Cooperative, Inc.*, 32 B.R. 427 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) and *In re Woodmoor Corp.*, 4 B.R. 186 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980). Therefore, Claim No. 188 cannot be considered properly filed by individual claimants. Furthermore, the Court previously held that cause was not established to justify extension of the claims bar date, adequate notice of this date having been given. Movant has again failed to substantiate cause for extending the bar date. As stated in movant's pleading, "in opting in, the individuals relied upon their claims against the debtor being presented for proper adjudication and therefore have relied upon their status as class members to obtain the relief to which they deem themselves entitled." Their claims were not properly presented for adjudication, but this fact cannot serve as a basis for extending the bar date.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the motions of Patrick T. Reid for (1) reconsideration of the order disallowing Claim No. 188; (2) for an order pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9014 applying Part VII of the Rules to this contested matter; and (3) for an order considering claims properly filed or alternatively permitting amendment or late filing of claims, are denied.

Dated this 11th day of September, 1985.

(s) William J. O'Neill  
United States Bankruptcy Judge



*11 U.S.C. § 502*

**11 U.S.C. § 502**

**§ 502. Allowance of claims or interests.**

(a) A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest, including a creditor of a general partner in a partnership that is a debtor in a case under chapter 7 of this title, objects.

(b) Except as provided in subsections (e)(2), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of this section, if such objection to a claim is made, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount, except to the extent that—

(1) such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured;

(2) such claim is for unmatured interest;

(3) if such claim is for a tax assessed against property of the estate, such claim exceeds the value of the interest of the estate in such property;

(4) if such claim is for services of an insider or attorney of the debtor, such claim exceeds the reasonable value of such services;

(5) such claim is for a debt that is unmatured on the date of the filing of the petition and that is excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(5) of this title;

(6) if such claim is the claim of a lessor for damages resulting from the termination of a lease of real property, such claim exceeds—

(A) the rent reserved by such lease, without acceleration, for the greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to

*11 U.S.C. § 502*

exceed three years, of the remaining term of such lease, following the earlier of—

(i) the date of the filing of the petition; and

(ii) the date on which such lessor repossessed, or the lessee surrendered, the leased property; plus

(B) any unpaid rent due under such lease, without acceleration, on the earlier of such dates;

(7) if such claim is the claim of an employee for damages resulting from the termination of an employment contract, such claim exceeds—

(A) the compensation provided by such contract, without acceleration, for one year following the earlier of—

(i) the date of the filing of the petition; or

(ii) the date on which the employer directed the employee to terminate, or such employee terminated, performance under such contract; plus

(B) any unpaid compensation due under such contract, without acceleration, on the earlier of such dates; or

(8) such claim results from a reduction, due to late payment, in the amount of an otherwise applicable credit available to the debtor in connection with an employment tax on wages, salaries, or commissions earned from the debtor.

(c) There shall be estimated for purpose of allowance under this section—

(1) any contingent or unliquidated claim, the fixing or liquidation of which, as the case may be, would unduly delay the administration of the case; or

*11 U.S.C. § 502*

(2) any right to payment arising from a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance.

(d) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall disallow any claim of any entity from which property is recoverable under section 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section 522(f), 522(h), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, unless such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property, for which such entity or transferee is liable under section 522(i), 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title.

(e)(1) Notwithstanding subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section and paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court shall disallow any claim for reimbursement or contribution of an entity that is liable with the debtor on or has secured the claim of a creditor, to the extent that—

(A) such creditor's claim against the estate is disallowed;

(B) such claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent as of the time of allowance or disallowance of such claim for reimbursement or contribution; or

(C) such entity asserts a right of subrogation to the rights of such creditor under section 509 of this title.

(2) A claim for reimbursement or contribution of such an entity that becomes fixed after the commencement of the case shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) of this section, the same as if such claim had become fixed before the date of filing of the petition.

(f) In an involuntary case, a claim arising in the ordinary course of the debtor's business or financial affairs after the commencement of the case but before the earlier of the appointment of a trustee and the order for relief shall be determined as of

*11 U.S.C. § 502*

the date such claim arises, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.

(g) A claim arising from the rejection, under section 365 of this title or under a plan under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor that has not been assumed shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.

(h) A claim arising from the recovery of property under section 522, 550, or 553 of this title shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.

(i) A claim that does not arise until after the commencement of the case for a tax entitled to priority under section 507(a)(7) of this title shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.

(j) A claim that has been allowed or disallowed may be reconsidered for cause. A reconsidered claim may be allowed or disallowed according to the equities of the case. Reconsideration of a claim under this subsection does not affect the validity of any payment or transfer from the estate made to a holder of an allowed claim on account of such allowed claim that is not reconsidered, but if a reconsidered claim is allowed and is of the same class as such holder's claim, such holder may not receive any additional payment or transfer from the estate on account of such holder's allowed claim until the holder of such reconsidered

*11 U.S.C. § 502*

and allowed claim receives payment on account of such claim proportionate in value to that already received by such other holder. This subsection does not alter or modify the trustee's right to recover from a creditor any excess payment or transfer made to such creditor.

**FED.R.CIV.P 23**

**Rule 23. Class Actions**

**(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action.** One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

**(b) Class Actions Maintainable.** An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

**(1)** the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of

**(A)** inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or

**(B)** adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or

**(2)** the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or

**(3)** the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the

*Fed.R.Civ.P 23*

findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.

**(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.**

(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.

(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel.

(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed,



*Fed.R.Civ.P 23*

and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.

(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.

**(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions.** In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.

**(e) Dismissal or Compromise.** A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.

*Bankruptcy Rule 2019.*

**Bankruptcy Rule 2019.**

**REPRESENTATION OF CREDITORS AND  
EQUITY SECURITY HOLDERS  
IN CHAPTER 9 MUNICIPALITY AND  
CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION CASES**

(a) *Data Required.* In a chapter 9 municipality or chapter 11 reorganization case, except with respect to a committee appointed pursuant to § 1102 of the Code, every entity or committee representing more than one creditor or equity security holder and, unless otherwise directed by the court, every indenture trustee, shall file a verified statement with the clerk setting forth

(1) the name and address of the creditor or equity security holder;

(2) the nature and amount of the claim or interest and the time of acquisition thereof unless it is alleged to have been acquired more than one year prior to the filing of the petition;

(3) a recital of the pertinent facts and circumstances in connection with the employment of the entity or indenture trustee, and, in the case of a committee, the name or names of the entity or entities at whose instance, directly or indirectly, the employment was arranged or the committee was organized or agreed to act; and

(4) with reference to the time of the employment of the entity, the organization or formation of the committee, or the appearance in the case of any indenture trustee, the amounts of claims or interests owned by the entity, the members of the committee or the indenture trustee, the times when acquired, the amounts paid therefor, and any sales or other disposition thereof.

*Bankruptcy Rule 2019.*

The statement shall include a copy of the instrument, if any, whereby the entity, committee, or indenture trustee is empowered to act on behalf of creditors or equity security holders. A supplemental statement shall be filed promptly, setting forth any material changes in the facts contained in the statement filed pursuant to this subdivision.

(b) *Failure to Comply; Effect.* On motion of any party in interest or on its own initiative, the court may

(1) determine whether there has been a failure to comply with the provisions of subdivision (a) of this rule or with any other applicable law regulating the activities and personnel of any entity, committee, or indenture trustee or any other impropriety in connection with any solicitation and, if it so determines, the court may refuse to permit that entity, committee, or indenture trustee to be heard further or to intervene in the case;

(2) examine any representation provision of a deposit agreement, proxy, trust mortgage, trust indenture, or deed of trust, or committee or other authorization, and any claim or interest acquired by any entity or committee in contemplation or in the course of a case under the Code and grant appropriate relief; and

(3) hold invalid any authority, acceptance, rejection, or objection given, procured, or received by an entity or committee who has not complied with this rule or with § 1125(b) of the Code.

*Bankruptcy Rule 3001.*

**Bankruptcy Rule 3001.**

**PROOF OF CLAIM**

(a) *Form and Content.* A proof of claim is a written statement setting forth a creditor's claim. A proof of claim for wages, salary, or commissions shall conform substantially to Official Form No. 20 or No. 21; any other proof of claim shall conform substantially to Official Form No. 19.

(b) *Who May Execute.* A proof of claim shall be executed by the creditor or the creditor's authorized agent except as provided in Rules 3004 and 3005.

(c) *Claim Based on a Writing.* When a claim, or an interest in property of the debtor securing the claim, is based on a writing, the original or a duplicate shall be filed with the proof of claim. If the writing has been lost or destroyed, a statement of the circumstances of the loss or destruction shall be filed with the claim.

(d) *Evidence of Perfection of Security Interest.* If a security interest in property of the debtor is claimed, the proof of claim shall be accompanied by evidence that the security interest has been perfected.

(e) *Transferred Claim.*

(1) *Unconditional Transfer Before Proof Filed.* If a claim other than one based on a bond or debenture has been unconditionally transferred before proof of the claim has been filed, the proof of claim may be filed only by the transferee. If the claim has been transferred after the filing of the petition, the proof of claim shall be supported by (A) a statement of the transferor acknowledging the transfer and stating the consideration therefor or (B) a statement of the transferee setting forth the consideration for the transfer and why the transferee is unable to obtain the statement from the transferor.

*Bankruptcy Rule 3001.*

(2) *Unconditional Transfer After Proof Filed.* If a claim other than one based on a bond or debenture has been unconditionally transferred after the proof of claim has been filed, evidence of the terms of the transfer shall be filed by the transferee. The clerk shall immediately notify the original claimant by mail of the filing of the evidence of transfer and that objection thereto, if any, must be filed with the clerk within 20 days of the mailing of the notice or within any additional time allowed by the court. If the court finds, after a hearing on notice, that the claim has been unconditionally transferred, it shall enter an order substituting the transferee for the original claimant, otherwise the court shall enter such order as may be appropriate.

(3) *Transfer of Claim for Security Before Proof Filed.* If a claim other than one based on a bond or debenture has been transferred for security before proof of the claim has been filed, the transferor or transferee or both may file a proof of claim for the full amount. The proof shall be supported by a statement setting forth the terms of the transfer. If the claim was transferred after the filing of the petition, the proof shall also be supported by (A) a statement of the transferor acknowledging the transfer and stating the consideration therefor, or (B) a statement of the transferee setting forth the consideration for the transfer and why the transferee is unable to obtain the statement from the transferor. If either the transferor or the transferee files a proof of claim, the clerk shall immediately notify the other by mail of the right to join in the filed claim. If both transferor and transferee file proofs of the same claim, the proofs shall be consolidated. After a hearing on notice, the court shall enter such orders respecting allowance and voting of the claim, payment of dividends thereon, and participation in the administration of the estate as may be appropriate.

*Bankruptcy Rule 3001.*

(4) *Transfer of Claim for Security After Proof Filed.* If a claim other than one based on a bond or debenture has been transferred for security after the proof of claim has been filed, evidence of the terms of the transfer shall be filed by the transferee. The clerk shall immediately notify the original claimant by mail of the filing of the evidence of transfer and that objection thereto, if any, must be filed with the clerk within 20 days of the mailing of the notice or within any additional time allowed by the court. After a hearing on notice, the court shall enter such orders respecting allowance and voting of the claim, payment of dividends thereon, and participation in the administration of the estate as may be appropriate.

(5) *Service of Objection; Notice of Hearing.* A copy of an objection to the evidence of transfer filed pursuant to paragraph (2) or (4) of this subdivision together with a notice of a hearing shall be mailed or otherwise delivered to the transferee at least 30 days prior to the hearing.

(f) *Evidentiary Effect.* A proof of claim executed and filed in accordance with these rules shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim.

(g) To the extent not inconsistent with the United States Warehouse Act or applicable State law, a warehouse receipt, scale ticket, or similar document of the type routinely issued as evidence of title by a grain storage facility, as defined in section 557 of title 11, shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of a claim of ownership of a quantity of grain.

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*Bankruptcy Rule 7023.*

**Bankruptcy Rule 7023.**

**CLASS PROCEEDINGS**

Rule 23 F.R. Civ. P. applies in adversary proceedings.



*Rule 9014.*

**Rule 9014.**

**CONTESTED MATTERS**

In a contested matter in a case under the Code not otherwise governed by these rules, relief shall be requested by motion, and reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing shall be afforded the party against whom relief is sought. No response is required under this rule unless the court orders an answer to a motion. The motion shall be served in the manner provided for service of a summons and complaint by Rule 7004, and, unless the court otherwise directs, the following rules shall apply: 7021, 7025, 7026, 7028-7037, 7041, 7042, 7052, 7054-7056, 7062, 7064, 7069, and 7071. The court may at any stage in a particular matter direct that one or more of the other rules in Part VII shall apply. An entity that desires to perpetuate testimony may proceed in the same manner as provided in Rule 7027 for the taking of a deposition before an adversary proceeding. The clerk shall give notice to the parties of the entry of any order directing that additional rules of Part VII are applicable or that certain of the rules of Part VII are not applicable. The notice shall be given within such time as is necessary to afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to comply with the procedures made applicable by the order.